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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Antitrust Law: Mergers -Preliminary Injunctions- DISTRICT
COURT MAY CONSIDER COMPANY'S IMMINENT DEPARTURE FROM
MARKET AS EVIDENCE REBUTTING FTC's PRIMA FACIE CASE
FTC v. National Tea Co.,
603 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1979)
Companies seeking to protect their share of the market
through a merger frequently run afoul of the Clayton Act. ' The
acquisition of a weak company may occasionally be defended by
employing the failing company defense if, without the merger,
the weak company will face business failure and leave the market.
Recently the Supreme Court, in United States v. General Dynamics
Corp.,2 added to the arsenal of defendant corporations by permit-
ting them to argue that the acquired company, despite a statisti-
cally significant share of the relevant market, added no competi-
tive strength to the acquiring company. 3 In FTC v. National Tea
Co., 4 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals read General Dynamics
expansively to permit the introduction of evidence showing that
the "weak" company, absent the proposed merger, would leave
the market. In affirming a district court's refusal to order a pre-
liminary injunction, the court blurred the requisites of both the
failing company and General Dynamics defenses. The National Tea
decision overstepped the clear limits of General Dynamics and in
doing so permits defendants to evade the strictures of the failing
company defense.
I
TRADITIONAL DEFENSES OF "WEAK COMPANIES"
The Clayton Act proscribes any acquisition by one corpora-
tion of the stock or assets of another if "the effect of such acquisi-
tion may be substantially to lessen competition." 5 Enforcement of
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
2 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
3 Id. at 503-06.
4 603 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1979).
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
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the act is vested in the Federal Trade Commission and the Justice
Department. 6  Only rarely have corporations repelled govern-
ment enforcement efforts.7 Courts have, however, established
two defenses for companies with weak competitive positions-the
failing company defense and the General Dynamics defense-to
help alleviate the harshest applications of the Clayton Act stan-
dard.
A. The Failing Company Defense
The Supreme Court, in International Shoe Co. v. FTC,8 laid
the foundation for the failing company defense. The Court held
that even if the FTC establishes that a merger will substantially
lessen competition, a court may allow the merger if the acquired
company has "resources so depleted and the prospect of rehabili-
tation so remote that it face[s] the grave probability of business
failure,"' and the acquiring company is the only prospective
purchaser. 10 The Court subsequently hinted at an even more
stringent "prospect of rehabilitation" standard' 1 but later cases
have not followed this interpretation.12
6 15 U.S.C. §§ 21(a), 25 (1976). The FTC may seek preliminary injunctions to prevent
violations of § 7 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976)), prior to an administrative
determination on the merits. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1976). The Justice Department may obtain
a temporary restraining order pending disposition of a case arising under § 7. 15 U.S.C.
§ 25 (1976).
' See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (dissenting opin-
ion, Stewart, J.); Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments: 1974, 75 COLUM. L. Rzv. 243, 243
(1975).
s 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
Id. at 302. See United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549, 555 (1971);
Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 137 (1969).
10 280 U.S. at 302. See Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 138
(1969).
Congress approved the defense after its judicial introduction in International Shoe. See
H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1949); S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 7
(1950), reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 4293, 4299.
See Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 137 (1968). By its lan-
guage, Citizen Publishing appeared to tighten the requirements set down in International
Shoe. See Note, The Failing Company Doctrine Since General Dynamics: More Than Excess Bag-
gage, 47 FORDHAM L. REv. 872, 878 (1979). The Court in Citizen Publishing noted that, since
International Shoe, more and more companies have been able to reorganize through receiv-
ership or the Bankruptcy Act. The Court went on to say: "The prospects of reorganization
... would have ... to be dim or nonexistent to make the failing company doctrine applica-
ble ...." 394 U.S. at 138. This language may tighten the requirements of International Shoe
by upgrading "grave" to "dim or nonexistent," and by adding a third test-no chance of
reorganization.
12 See United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 96 (D. Colo. 1975). But see United
States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1259-60 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd, 418
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The defense has been subject to varying justifications. Some
courts reason that since, absent the merger, the failing firm will
leave the market, there is no anticompetitive effect if another cor-
poration absorbs the failing firm.13  The general trend, however,
is toward the "lesser of two evils" approach recently described by
the Court in General Dynamics: 14 possible anticompetitive effects
are outweighed by the potential harm to the employees, stockhold-
ers, and creditors of the failing firm. 15
U.S. 906 (1974). The Supreme Court, in United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402
U.S. 549 (1971), merely repeated the International Shoe language. Id. at 555.
The "only prospective purchaser" requirement has also been subject to varying in-
terpretations. The Court in Citizen Publishing, after using the word "prospective" (394 U.S.
at 137), switched to "available" (id. at 138). The latter may be a stricter standard. See Note,
supra note 11, at 878. "Prospective" may connote a purchaser who is already interested,
while "available" may mean any purchaser who could become interested. Some courts, in-
cluding the Supreme Court, have ignored Citizen Publishing. See United States v. Greater
Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549, 555 (1971); United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp.
78, 101-03 (D. Colo. 1975). But see United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp.
729, 781-82 (D. Md. 1976) (defendant failed to establish failing company defense because it
made no attempt to secure alternative purchaser). If there really is a difference, "available"
seems to be followed: courts tend to look at the defendants' efforts to procure another
buyer. See Greater Buffalo, 402 U.S. at 556 ("the numerous other [prospective purchasers]
were never even approached"); Black & Decker, 430 F. Supp. at 781-82; M.P.M., Inc., 397
F. Supp. at 101-03. Both words, however, are misleading. The best approach is to require
the buyer to be the least anticompetitive purchaser. See United States v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1259 (D.C. Cal. 1973), aff'd, 418 U.S. 906 (1974). If the only other
"available" or "prospective" buyers are more anticompetitive than the proposed buyer, the
weak company should not be denied the defense.
'' See United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 95 (D. Colo. 1975) (apparent
rationale of defense: if one of the merging companies is bound to fail, competition cannot
be harmed by acquisition of that firm); United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers
Ass'n, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 799, 808 (D.D.C. 1958) ("the acquisition of a failing corporation
... cannot result in lessening competition .... ") (citing International Shoe), modified and aff'd,
362 U.S. 458 (1960).
'4 See 415 U.S. at 507.
's See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 372 n.46 (1963) (suggest-
ing that the failing company defense "might have somewhat larger contours as applied to
bank mergers because of the greater public impact of a bank failure compared with ordinary
business failures.") (emphasis added); International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302
(1930) ("with resulting loss to ... stockholders and injury to the communities where ...
plants were operated"); United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 95 (D. Colo.
1975); Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARV. L.
REV. 226, 340 (1960).
Citizen Publishing suggested a reason for a shift in the rationale:
[A]t the time the International Shoe Co. case was decided § 7 of the Clayton Act
provided: "[N]o corporation ... shall acquire ... stock or other share capital of
another corporation ... where the effect of such acquisition may be to substan-
tially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the
corporation making the acquisition .. " Consequently, where the acquired com-
pany was "such as to necessitate liquidation," and where "the prospect for fu-
ture competition ... was entirely eliminated," it may have been reasonable to
conclude that there was no more existing competition between the companies to
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B. The General Dynamics Defense
In 1974, a second defense became available to weak com-
panies attempting to merge. The Supreme Court in General
Dynamics held that a defendant in an FTC action to block a
merger can rebut the FTC's prima facie case by demonstrating
that the acquired company was not an effective competitor at the
industry's focus of competition.16 The case involved the acquisi-
tion of a coal company by General Dynamics, a large, diversified
company attempting to expand its operations. The Supreme
Court found that competitive ability in the coal industry hinged
on the availability of coal reserves. "7 The acquired company had
committed nearly all of its reserves and had little chance of ex-
panding its supply. 18 General Dynamics successfully rebutted the
government's statistical showing of undue concentration' 9 by
showing that the acquired company had little potential to compete
in the future, and "was a far less significant factor in the coal
market than ... the production statistics seemed to indicate.
20
be lessened by acquisition. In 1950, however, § 7 was amended to make the
measure of anticompetitive acquisitions the extent to which they lessened com-
petition "in any line of commerce," rather than the extent to which they les-
sened competition "between" the two companies.
394 U.S. at 136-37 n.3 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
The current rationale, however, may also be derived from the original sources on the
failing company defense. See International Shoe, 280 U.S. at 302-03; S. REP. No. 1775, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1950) ("any firm in [a failing] condition should be free to dispose of its
stock or assets"), reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4293, 4299.
The "lesser of two evils" approach is preferable because the "no competition to lessen"
approach disregards the possibility that the failing company will become revitalized. See
Note, supra note 11, at 886-87. Furthermore, if the acquisition of a failing company does
not lessen competition, an affirmative defense is unnecessary-the companies will have
rebutted the FTC's case. See United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729,
776 (D. Md. 1976) ("the court's finding that the ... merger does not violate section 7
precludes defendants' need to rely on the failing company defense ...."). Finally, the "only
available purchaser" requirement is irrelevant unless imposed to minimize the merger's
anticompetitive effects; it is not needed where there are presumed to be no such effects.
See note 12 supra.
16 415 U.S. at 503-04.
17 Id. at 499-502.
18 Id. at 502-03.
I9 Id. at 493. By a showing of concentration "in terms of market share statistics," the
government may "[make] out a prima facie case of a violation of § 7." United States v.
Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 120 (1974). The defendant must then show
"that the market-share statistics [give] an inaccurate account of the acquisitions' probable
effects on competition." Id. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321,
365-67 (1963). In General Dynamics, the number of competitors in, the relevant market had
decreased by 73% in a ten-year span, and the merger substantially increased the concentra-
tion of market shares among the top firms. 415 U.S. at 494-95.
20 415 U.S. at 503.
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The Court rejected the FTC's argument that the result al-
lowed General Dynamics to defend on the ground of the acquired
company's weakness without having to meet the stringent failing
company standards. 21 It found that General Dynamics' defense,
unlike the failing company defense, was not an affirmative
defense-General Dynamics' evidence "went to the heart of the
Government's ... prima facie case"' 22 by showing that the merger
would not have significant anticompetitive effects.23
Unless carefully limited, General Dynamics is vulnerable to
abuse. The defense requires more than a mere showing that one
of the companies is a weak competitor: the weakness must occur
at the focus of competition.24
United States v. International Harvester Co. 25 demonstrates the
problems that occur when a court does not adhere to this limita-
tion. 2 6  In International Harvester, the 'defendant acquired another
21 Id. at 506-08.
For the argument that under General Dynamics "the failing company defense might
well become a piece of excess baggage," see Robinson, supra note 7, at 251-52. But see Note,
supra note 11. The problem may have been anticipated in Bok, supra note 15, at 341:
[E]ven if business failure seems remote, evidence of financial weakness may
tend somewhat to reduce the apparent significance of the disappearance of the
acquired firm from the market. As a result, there will be an inevitable tempta-
tion to introduce evidence of financial instability in an attempt to have the am-
biguities of the case resolved in favor of the merger.
22 415 U.S. at 508.
23 Id. at 498, 510-11.
24 Id. at 501. See United States v. Amax, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 956, 970 (D. Conn. 1975)
("[u]nder ... General Dynamics this court must analyze the present and future competitive
strength at the 'focus of competition.'" (citation omitted). This is consistent with the Su-
preme Court's requirement of clear evidence rebutting the government's prima facie case.
See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963) ("a merger which
produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market, and results
in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market, is so inherently likely
to lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence
clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects.") (emphasis
added). Precise limitations on the General Dynamics defense may be necessary because
"Congress used the words 'may be substantially to lessen competition,' to indicate that its
concern was with probabilities, not certainties." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 323 (1962) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). With regard to the words "may
be," the final Senate Report on the 1950 amendments to the Clayton Act (see note 15 supra)
stated that "[a] requirement of certainty and actuality of injury to competition is incompat-
ible with any effort to supplement the Sherman Act by reaching incipient restraints." S.
REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1950), reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4293, 4298. Easing the government's burden of proof without placing corresponding
limits upon rebuttal evidence might introduce "the danger of subverting congressional in-
tent by permitting a too-broad economic investigation." Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at
362 (citing Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 313 (1949)).
25 564 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1977).
26 For criticisms of the International Harvester decision, see Note, Horizontal Mergers after
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heavy equipment manufacturer that was very weak financially and
could not obtain credit to solve its problems. 27  The Seventh Cir-
cuit assumed that because the acquired company was weak, its ac-
quisition by defendant would not damage competition.2 8 The
court failed to relate the acquired company's weakness to competi-
tion in the industry.29  International Harvester provided the ac-
quired company with the necessary funding to become a thriving
competitor. 30
II
FTC v. NATIONAL TEA Co.
In FTC v. National Tea Co.,3 the Eighth Circuit read General
Dynamics broadly and, in doing so, added a new dimension to the
weak company defenses. National Tea, a national chain of super-
markets operating stores in the- Minneapolis area, attempted to
acquire Applebaums' Food Markets, Inc., a local chain of super-
markets. 32  The FTC brought an action for a preliminary injunc-
tion to restrain the merger on the ground that the merger would
United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 92 HARV. L. REv. 491, 510-11 (1978); Note,
supra note 11, at 878.
27 564 F.2d at 774-75.
28 Id. at 774.
29 The court seems to have based its decision partially upon the General Dynamics de-
fense and partially upon the finding that due to "a 'clear understanding ... [the acquiring
company] had no intent nor was it to seek control of [the acquired company] through the
stock acquisition.' ... [T]he Stock Purchase Agreement expressly stated this intent." United
States v. International Harvester Co., 564 F.2d 769, 777 (7th Cir. 1977).
30 Id. at 777. Because the court was aware of the merger's consequences, the decision
may well have been based on the acquiring company's failure to exercise control. See note
29 supra. But in that case, the discussion of the acquired company's weak financial status
was unnecessary.
An even broader reading of General Dynamics was assayed in United States v. Consoli-
dated Foods Corp., [1978-1] TRADE CAs. (CCH) 62,063 (E.D Pa. 1978). The Department
of Justice brought suit to enjoin the merger of Consolidated Foods, then 78th on Fortune's
1977 Directory of the Five Hundred Largest U.S. Industrial Corporations, and Chef
Pierre, Inc., a producer of frozen dessert pies. The court, citing International Harvester ap-
provingly, found that Consolidated's pie division, Sara Lee, was such a "weakened
firm"- particularly in the market for frozen pumpkin pies-that General Dynamics man-
dated that the court look beyond the post-merger market shares. The court noted that
Chef Pierre's technological expertise would enable Sara Lee "to market a truly competitive
pie for the first time" (id. at 74,614), choosing to ignore the fact that the pie would be
produced in a market where the merged companies, and two others, would control 62% of
the market (id. at 74,613).
21 603 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1979).
32 Id. at 695.
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create undue concentration among the major grocery retailing
firms in the relevant market. 33 The district court denied the mo-
tion for a preliminary injunction, basing its decision primarily on
the finding that National Tea would probably leave the market if
the merger were enjoined. 34 The Eighth Circuit affirmed, ruling
that the district court had neither used an incorrect standard 35
nor abused its discretion.
After considering the facts of the case in light of General
Dynamics, the appellate court held that the lower court had prop-
erly considered National Tea's probable exit if the merger was
blocked. 36  National Tea's inability to compete resulted from its
11 Id. at 695-96. See note 6 supra. For the FTC's complaint, see National Tea Co., 3
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,556 (Apr. 17, 1979).
34 603 F.2d at 699, 701.
35 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) provides:
Upon a proper showing that, weighing the equities and considering the [FTC's]
likelihood of ultimate success, such action would be in the public interest, and
after notice to the defendant, a temporary restraining order or a preliminary
injunction may be granted ....
The Eighth Circuit approved of the district court's decision to consider both public
and private equities. The magistrate to whom the matter was first referred had found that
the public equities (primarily the difficulty of effective divestiture) prevailed over the pri-
vate equities (Applebaum's management problems) and recommended that the motion for
the preliminary injunction should be granted. The district court, however, found the
equities to be "close": divestiture would not be a severe problem because National Tea had
committed itself to full divestiture within six months after a final judgment against it. 603
F.2d at 697 & n.3. The Eighth Circuit suggested that public equities should generally be
given the greater weight but found that the district court had not abused its discretion. Id.
But cf. FTC v. Food Town Stores, Inc., 539 F.2d 1339, 1346 (4th Cir. 1976) (consideration
of private equities improper; hardship will always result if merger is enjoined yet Congress
gave it little weight); Bok, supra note 15, at 340-41.
The court then examined the FTC's likelihood of success. The court approved a stan-
dard that required the FTC to raise "questions going to the merits so serious, substantial,
difficult and doubtful as to make them fair ground for thorough investigation, study, de-
liberation and determination by the FTC in the first instance and ultimately by the Court
of Appeals." 603 F.2d at 698. The court rejected an even more stringent standard conclud-
ing that it would frustrate the Clayton Act's "intended protection of the public interest." Id.
The court's acceptance of a rather tentative finding of National Tea's probable depar-
ture from the market (see note 49 infra) may be, in part, a corollary to its selection of the
standard for "likelihood of success." The FTC may meet this burden simply by showing
that the issues and evidence to be presented are so complex as to be inappropriate for a
ruling at a preliminary hearing. Given judicial time constraints and the broad range of
economic inquiry permitted by General Dynamics, tentative findings may be the only availa-
ble defensive technique. A more thorough exposition of the defendant's position merely
plays into the FTC's hands.
36 603 F.2d at 699. Although the precedential effect of the courts acceptance of a
tentative finding of National Tea's departure from the market (see note 35 supra) may be
confined to FTC preliminary injunction actions, its finding only goes to the weight to be
given that evidence. The court's ruling on admissibility, however, should apply both in
preliminary injunction hearings and hearings on the merits: the defendant used its proba-
ble departure as part of its rebuttal of the FTC's prima facie case.
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small, poorly located stores. With its outdated buildings, National
Tea could not stock as many items as its competitors. 37  Despite
its employment of a real estate department, it failed to obtain new
sites. Indeed, real estate developers viewed National Tea as a
"nonissue." 3 8 Thus National Tea, like the acquired company in
General Dynamics, had exhausted its ability to obtain a vital, limited
resource. 39 Similarly, the disability caused significant weakness at
the industry's focus of competition-sales.4 °
The merger's probability of improving National Tea's com-
petitive strength, however, raises a significant difference between
General Dynamics and National Tea. In General Dynamics, the ac-
quired company added little competitive strength to the acquiring
company. 41  In National Tea, the acquiring company had little fu-
ture competitive strength in its present state. But the merger would
almost certainly increase National Tea's competitive strength be-
cause Applebaum's would provide National Tea with store sites,
managerial expertise, and a more favorable image. 42  National
Tea could capitalize on these gains from its post-merger position
as the market's leading firm. 43
The National Tea court looked beyond the immediate effects
of the merger and compared the market's future if the merger
occurred with the market's future if it did not. 44  The court de-
'7 National Tea's stores averaged 13,751 square feet in selling area, while those of its
largest competitors ranged in size from 20,000 to 92,000 square feet. Most of National
Tea's stores were built in the late 1950's and early 1960's. Since then the necessary number
of stock items has risen from 6,000 to over 12,000. 603 F.2d at 699.
38 Id.
3' See text accompanying notes 17-20 supra.
0 The National Tea court did not explicitly find sales to be the industry's focus of
competition (see 603 F.2d at 699-700), but it left no other logical choice. While deciding
that sales were not the focus of competition in the coal industry, the Court in General
Dynamics stated:
In markets involving groceries or beer, ... statistics involving annual sales
naturally indicate the power of each company to compete in the future. Evi-
dence of the amount of annual sales is relevant as a prediction of future com-
petitive strength, since in most markets distribution systems and brand recogni-
tion are such significant factors that one may reasonably suppose that a com-
pany which has attracted a given number of sales will retain that competitive
strength.
415 U.S. at 501.
1, 415 U.S. at 493-94.
42 See Petitioner's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Injunction
Pending Appeal at 9 & n.5, FTC v. National Tea Co., 603 F.2d,694 (8th Cir. 1979).
43 603 F.2d at 701. The market share of the top four firms, with the merger, would
increase from 44.5% to 49%. Id. This, essentially, was the FTC's prima facie case.
11 Id. at 700.
1980] 445
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
termined that National Tea would probably leave the market if
the merger failed, and that increased concentration would re-
suit: 4 5 "Obviously, if National had experienced such serious mar-
keting problems in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area that it was leav-
ing the area, its present market share was an inaccurate reflection
of its future competitive strength."4 6 This was not the case in
General Dynamics, where the present status of the market accu-
rately reflected its future-the acquired company did not have
coal reserves and was not going to get any. In General Dynamics
the government's market share statistics were shown to be irrele-
vant because they did not reflect the company's weakness at the
focus of competition. The National Tea court found the FTC's
statistics relevant, but concluded that they did not fully reflect the
market's future because of National Tea's imminent departure
from the market.
In sum, unlike General Dynamics, the National Tea court
sanctioned a merger that would remedy the weak company's
weakness at the focus of competition. More important, the court
allowed the acquiring company's alleged departure from the mar-
ket to be weighed, not as a failing company affirmative defense,
but in rebuttal to the government's prima facie statistical case.
III
THE FUTURE OF THE FAILING COMPANY DEFENSE
Because National Tea hinged on a finding that without the
merger, National Tea would probably leave the market, the deci-
sion may seriously impair the viability of the failing company de-
fense.4" Admission of that evidence was arguably within the
ambit of General Dynamics: the government's market share statistics
should be ignored if they do not reflect the market's future. The
court's opinion, however, evidences a resurgence of the discarded
rationale for the failing company defense: if the weak firm will
leave the market absent a merger, the merger will have no an-
ticompetitive effects.4" Traditionally, a small failing firm must
meet the stringent failing company standards in order to dispose
of its stock. National Tea permitted a large national firm to expand
45 Id. at 701.
46 Id. at 700.
47 The Eighth Circuit rejected this objection without discussion. Id. at 700 n.8.
" See notes 13-15 and accompanying text supra.
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by showing that it would leave one market. The latter merger is
less desirable, yet the requisite showing under National Tea is
easier.49
To ensure that every "weak company" cannot successfully
avoid Clayton Act enforcement actions solely on the basis of
weakness, courts should require that the weakness occur at the
focus of competition" ° and that the weakness be caused by an ir-
remediable lack of a physical resource vital to the particular indus-
try. In General Dynamics the acquired company's weakness was due
to a limited physical resource-coal reserves-not a limited fun-
gible commodity -finances -as in International Harvester or re-
sources that could be supplied by the other party to the
merger-store sites, expertise and a positive consumer image-as
in National Tea.5 1 The availability of the natural resource on
which the industry thrives better indicates the competitive effects
of the merger; a company's weak financial status may reflect no
more than fluctuating conditions in the industry, low prices, 52 or
past business judgments. 53  If courts allow mergers to remedy
such temporary phenomena, strong companies could merge with
"weak" ones and create an anticompetitive market merely by pro-
viding financing.
49 Besides the absence of the "only prospective purchaser" requirement, National Tea
may permit a lower evidentiary standard for a showing of incipient failure than the failing
company defense. See notes 9-12 and accompanying text supra. The Eighth Circuit found
only that National Tea would "probably" fail. 603 F.2d at 709. t 4his evidentiary standard,
however, may be linked to the court's selection of a "likelihood of success" standard (see
note 35 supra) and confined to preliminary injunction actions (see note 36 supra).
50 It is important to note the evidentiary purpose the "focus of competition" require-
ment serves. In International Harvester the Seventh Circuit found that, due to the required
company's weakness, sales figures did not accurately reflect the firm's competitive ability.
But the court found no other measure of competitive ability. The Supreme Court tried to
avoid such loose analysis when it directed courts "to simplify the test of illegality ... in the
interest of sound and practical judicial administration." United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963).
"' See The Pillsbury Co., [1976-79 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,586,
21,709 (June 15, 1979) (suggesting limitation of General Dynamics "to situations involving a
depletable natural resource.)"
Finding a limited physical resource is not the same as finding the focus of competi-
tion. The limited resource must cause the company's weakness at the focus of competition.
Thus, in General Dynamics, long-term contracts were the focus of competition; the acquired
company could not compete because of its lack of coal reserves. See text accompanying
notes 17-20 supra.
52 See United States v. Amax, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 956, 971 (D. Conn. 1975) (court re-
fused to credit evidence of defendant's weak financial condition because of "the current
lull in [the industry's] prices").
53 The FTC, reacting in part to the decisions in International Harvester and United
States v. Consolidated Foods Corp., [1978-1] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 62,063 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
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Further, courts should not admit evidence of a company's
departure from the market outside the context of the failing
company defense. The defendant in National Tea could not have
qualified as a failing company. First, it was not "failing." At worst
National Tea would choose to leave the Minneapolis area while
continuing in business on a national scale-the merger was not
compelled by irreversible business failure. 54  Second, National
Tea would have to meet the "only prospective purchaser" re-
quirement. 55  Despite the reversal of roles-the weak company
was the acquiring company-National Tea would have had to
show that there was no other entity with which it could combine
to avoid "failure." 56
Under the heady influence of General Dynamics, the National
Tea court permitted an inadequately supported weak company re-
sponse to obtain a result unjustified under either the failing com-
pany or General Dynamics defense. Perhaps the court was swayed
by the equities-in a time of economic distress, the loss of 850
jobs would be a heavy blow to a community whether National
Tea's departure was-caused by abject failure or an exercise of bus-
iness judgment. But Congress and the Supreme Court balanced
these equities in creating the Clayton Act defenses. Outside this
narrow list of exceptions, the protection of the public-at-large
should not admit of any variance.
Wilbur Miller
(See note 30 supra), has drawn a hard line on the admissibility of "financial weakness":
[Inclusion of financial weakness as a separate ... defense ... raises serious
antitrust policy problems. First, there may be a sort of double counting in that
financial weakness may already be reflected in a market share of the troubled
company that is lower than it would have been .... Second, the issue of finan-
cial weakness is extremely difficult to handle in court, and susceptible to in-
vented claims and vague expert testimony generating factual issues that the
courts are not well equipped to measure. Third, if all sorts of company "weak-
nesses" or structural market changes operating to the disadvantage of particular
companies, can overcome a primafacie case of illegality, then the whole valuable
trend in merger enforcement toward streamlining cases by concentrating on
properly measured market shares and concentration ratios will be undermined.
The Pillsbury Co. [1976-79 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,586, 21,709
(June 15, 1979). See Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., [1976-79 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,578 (May 17, 1979).
5 See notes 9, 11-12 and accompanying text supra.
5 See note 10 supra.
'6 See United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 101-02 (D. Colo. 1975).
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Banks and Banking-Administrative Law-FEDERAL HOME LOAN
BANK BOARD DECISION ON BRANCHING APPLICATION RIGOROUSLY
REVIEWED UNDER ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS STANDARD
City Federal Savings & Loan Association v. FHLBB,
600 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1979)
Branching is currently the most common means of expansion
in the savings and loan industry.' Although the total assets held
by savings and loan associations have increased relative to other
financial intermediaries in recent years,2 the absolute number of
associations has declined.3 Expansion in the number of branch
I In 1955, there were only 601 branch offices in existence. By 1970, this figure had
increased to 4,318. At the end of 1978, there were 14,162 branch offices and 4,723 main
or unit offices for a total of 18,885 savings and loan offices. UNITED STATES LEAGUE OF
SAVINGS ASSOCIATION, 1979 SAVINGS AND LOAN FACT BOOK 54 [hereinafter cited as 1979
FACT BooK].
Savings and loan associations also expand through merger. Merger activity peaked in
1971, when 132 mergers occurred, but has since declined; only 44 mergers took place in
1978. Id. at 52-54, table 45. Congress recently took steps to curtail expansion of savings
and loan associations by limiting company consolidations and interlocking directorships.
Tide II of the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978
prohibits new interlocking directorships within the same city or metropolitan area and out-
laws expansion of a savings and loan holding company beyond $1 billion in assets. Deposit-
ory Institution Management Interlocks, 12 U.S.C.A. § 8201 (1978). See generally 44 Fed.
Reg. 42,161 (1979) (FHLBB's regulations implementing the Act).
An association may wish to establish branch offices for various reasons. Branching
allows an association to expand its serviceable market area, which is likely to increase its
asset portfolio. Branching also offers the advantages of economies of scale. See Benston,
Cost of Operations and Economies of Scale in Savings and Loan Associations, in 2 STUDY OF THE
SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY 676, 712 (I. Friend ed. 1969) (economies realized by branch-
ing in areas that attract customers through branch offices); Brigham & Pettit, Effects of
Structure on Performance in the Savings and Loan Industry, in 3 STUDY OF THE SAVINGS AND
LOAN INDUSTRY 971, 1027 (I. Friend ed. 1969) ("A new facility, regardless of its size, will
always have lower operating costs if it is part of a branch system that is large enough to be
operating efficiently...."). Cf. Gilbert & Longbrake, The Effects of Branching by Financial
Institutions on Competition, Productive Efficiency, and Stability: An Examination of the Evidence, 4
J. BANK RESEARCH 209, 306 (1974) (branching increases efficiency and competition without
harming smaller institutions); Mullineaux, Economies of Scale and Organizational Efficiency in
Banking: A Profit-Function Approach, 33 J. FINANCE 259, 278 (1978) (legal restrictions in unit
banking states prohibit achievement of scale economies).
2 In 1950, savings and loan associations ranked behind commercial banks, life. insur-
ance companies, and mutual savings banks in total assets behind commercial banks. At the
end of 1978, savings and loans ranked second with $523.6 billion in assets, behind commer-
cial banks, which controlled $1,284.0 billion in assets. 1979 FACT BOOK, supra note 1, at 46,
table 37. During 1978, total assets of savings and loans grew by 14% as compared to 10.1%
for commercial banks, 7.4% for mutual savings banks and 10.6% for life insurance com-
panies. Id. at 47.
' The total number of savings and loan associations (both state and federally char-
tered) peaked at 6,112 in 1966. Id. at 54, table 46. There were only 4,723 chartered associ-
ations at the end of 1978. Id.
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offices for each chartered association 4 has matched growth in
total assets.
A trend toward modernized banking regulations 5 has fos-
tered the proliferation of branching. The Federal Home Loan
Bank Board (FHLBB), an independent federal agency charged
with regulating all federally chartered savings and loan associa-
tions, 6 championed the liberalization of federal branching pol-
icy.7 The results of this crusade have not been uniformly benefi-
cial. Relaxed branching' regulations have impeded the ability of
competing savings and loans to challenge Board approval of
branching applications. Such challenges are especially difficult
under FHLBB procedures for processing applications and under
the arbitrary and capricious standard for judicial review of the
Board's decision. Courts have incorrectly applied this standard to
FHLBB branching decisions, compounding the problems gener-
See note I supra.
On the regulation of savings and loan associations, and of branching in particular,
see Bartell, Examination and Supervision, in 4 STUDY OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY
1689, 1749-50 (1. Friend ed. 1969) (recommending changes in supervision to prevent sav-
ings and loan failures); COMMISSION ON MONEY AND CREDIT, MONEY AND CREDIT, THEIR
INFLUENCE ON JoBs, PRICES AND GROWTH 166-67 (1961) (recommending that federal sav-
ings and loans branch into any trading area); Friend, Summary and Recommendations, in 1
STUDY OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY 1, 12 (I. Friend ed. 1969) (widen scope of
branching to achieve economies of scale); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON FINANCIAL STRUC-
TURE AND REGULATION, REPORT 59 (R. Hunt chrm. 1972) (states should remove branching
restrictions).
Numerous other commentators have criticized the current regulation of banks and
other financial intermediaries. See, e.g., Clark, The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, 85
YALE L.J. 1, 44 (1976); Davis, Banking Regulation Today: A Banker's View, 31 L. & CONTEMP.
PROB. 639 (1966); Kreps, Modernizing Banking Regulation, id. at 648.
6 In 1932, Congress passed the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, establishing a system of
12 federal banks analogous to the Federal Reserve Bank system, and the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board, designed to service the savings and loan industry. Pub. L. No. 72-304,
47 Stat. 725 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449 (1976)). In 1933, it enacted the Home
Owners' Loan Act, which authorized the FHLBB to charter savings and loan associations.
Pub. L. No. 73-43, 48 Stat. 128 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1468 (1976)). The FHLBB
was originally an independent federal agency, but during the 1940's and early 1950's it was
subordinate to several federal housing agencies. In 1955, the FHLBB resumed its status as
an independent regulatory agency. See 12 U.S.C. § 1437(b) (1976); T. MARVELL, THE FED-
ERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD 38-39 (1969).
' "As a general policy, the Board encourages the establishment of branch offices and
other office facilities by Federal associations in communities and market areas which either
are not serviced or are underserviced by existing savings and loan facilities." 12 C.F.R. §
556.5(b)(5) (1979). The Board also favors increasing competition by "permitting more than
one savings and loan facility in a market area." Id. See generally Carrington, Not Planning to
Branch?, FED. HOME LOAN BANK BOARD J. 15 (Sept. 1973); 44 Fed. Reg. 36,057, 36,059
(1979) (comments by FHLBB supporting proposed rule to expand branching).
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ated by the Board's failure to provide an adequate forum for chal-
lenging its decisions and to explain those decisions.
The Seventh Circuit confronted these difficulties in City Fed-
eral Savings & Loan Association v. FHLBB .8  It correctly repudiated
settled practice concerning judicial review of FHLBB decisions
and undermined the Board's long-standing privilege of operating
in obscurity.
I
THE LEGAL CONTEXT OF CITY FEDERAL
A. FHLBB Procedures
Acting on applications for branch offices has become one of
the FHLBB's important regulatory functions. The Home Owner's
Loan Act of 19339 (HOLA) did not explicitly grant the FHLBB
power to authorize federal associations to establish branches.
Nonetheless, many courts have held that the Act confers this au-
thority by implication,'0 and the FHLBB has issued extensive reg-
ulations to govern branch applications. An applicant association
must show:
(1) the necessity for the branch in the community it will serve;
(2) the reasonable probability of success for the branch;
(3) that there will be no undue injury to existing thrift institu-
tions; and
(4) that the applicant has met the credit requirements of com-
munities it currently serves."
8 600 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1979).
9 Act of June 13, 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-43, 48 Stat. 128 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464
(1976)). For a general history of the Home Owners' Loan Act and federal law creating
savings and loans, see Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fox, 459 F. Supp. 903, 908-10
(C.D. Cal. 1978).
10 Section 5(a) of the Home Owners' Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1976), gave the
FHLBB authority to charter savings and loan associations "giving primary consideration to
the best practices of local mutual thrift and home-financing institutions in the United
States." Several federal courts have relied on the broad grant of discretion in § 5(a) of the
Act as authority for the FHLBB's power to allow federal associations to branch. See, e.g.,
City Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 600 F.2d 681, 685-86 (7th Cir. 1979). Other fed-
eral courts have implied this authority from § 5(c) of the Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c) (1976),
which allows federally chartered associations to invest in mortgages on residential property
located within 100 miles of the home office. See, e.g., North Arlington Nat'l Bank v. Kearny
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 187 F.2d 564, 565 (3d Cir. 1951). See generally Fayetteville Sav. &
Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 570 F.2d 693, 697 (8th Cir. 1978).
11 12 C.F.R. § 545.14(c) (1979). These criteria are the same as those the Board uses in
its chartering decisions, except that branch applicants must show that they have met the
19801
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Federally chartered savings and loan associations, and, in
some cases, state chartered associations and state and federally
chartered banks,12 may challenge a branch proposal. If the Board
credit needs of their communities rather than that persons of "good character and respon-
sibility" run the association. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 1464(e) (1976) with 12 C.F.R. § 545.14(c)
(1979).
The Board recently proposed a regulation which, if adopted, would modify these
branching criteria. The proposed rule would "revise criteria to include only the 'undue
injury' test and applicant's performance under the Community Reinvestment Act." 44 Fed.
Reg. 36,060 (1979). Performance under the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) shows
the extent to which an applicant has made loans in its local community. The Board also
proposes to apply these same criteria to all other facilities requiring Board approval (i.e.,
satellite, limited facility, and mobile offices). The reason for the change is that the Board
"believes that branching should be a business decision of the management of an association
and that it should generally defer to that decision unless supervisory, 'undue injury', or
CRA problems exist." 44 Fed. Reg. 36,061 (1979). Although elimination of the "necessity"
test is questionable, it is possible to rephrase challenges based on lack of necessity in terms
of undue injury. Elimination of this criterion will not likely reduce the number of chal-
lenges to the Board's branching decisions.
Under current law, a branch applicant also must be eligible under 12 C.F.R. §
545.14(b) (1979) and its proposed operations must not "afford a basis for supervisory ob-
jection." 12 C.F.R. § 545.14(d)(2) (1979). The FHLBB's regulations empower the Director
of the Office of Examinations and Supervision to determine whether the applicant's net
worth, management, lending practices, assets, and current operations are satisfactory be-
fore the Board will consider the branch application. 12 C.F.R. § 556.5(a)(7) (1979). No
reported cases challenging the Board's discretion concerning this factor have been dis-
covered.
There are several other, more objective criteria which may affect a branching decision.
Although the Board now allows statewide branching (see 44 Fed. Reg. 4899, 36,012-13
(1979)), it generally does not allow interstate branching. See 12 C.F.R. § 556.5(b)(2) (1979).
There are, however, exceptions to this rule, and the Board recently proposed a new regu-
lation which would allow interstate branching within the Washington, D.C.-Maryland-
Virginia area. 44 Fed. Reg. 36,057 (1979). The Board also generally prohibits a federal
association from branching in a state which does not allow its own state chartered associa-
tions to establish branches. 12 C.F.R. § 556.5(b)(1) (1979). See Bloomfield Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. American Community Stores, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 384, 388-89 (D. Neb. 1975). The
Board nevertheless makes exceptions to this rule, and a recent case upheld the Board's
discretion to allow branching in such a state. Lyons Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 377 F.
Supp. II (N.D. 11. 1974). See 51 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 656 (1975). The Board will also give
special treatment to an application for a branch office that will serve "low-income, inner-
city areas which are inadequately served by existing savings and loan facilities." 12 C.F.R. §
556.5(b)(4)(ii) (1979).
12 In theory the FHLBB may be sued only by a federally chartered savings and loan
association, its officers, and its directors. Central Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 422 F.2d
504, 505 (8th Cir. 1970); 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d) (1976). But a state chartered bank or savings
and loan may sue the Board if it names the individual members of the Board as party
defendants. Courts have held, without explanation, that this triggers federal question juris-
diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976). Bank of Ozark v. FHLBB, 402 F. Supp. 162, 165
(E.D. Ark. 1975). See also Community Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 443 F. Supp. 927 (E.D.
Wis. 1978), vacated sub nom. City Fed Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 600 F.2d 681 (7th Cir.
1979) (state chartered associations named Board members as defendants).
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receives a "substantial protest," a hearing officer appointed by the
Board hears oral argument on the application at the request of
the protesting party.13 The Board itself, after reviewing the evi-
dence and the recommendations of its staff and the hearing of-
ficer, either grants or denies the application. 14
No statute or regulation requires the Board to announce
reasons for the decisions it makes on branching applications and
subsequent protests. 15 Although Congress amended the HOLA
State chartered associations are not free from federal regulation, however; many are
subject to both state and federal control. Deposit insurance through the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), mandatory for federally chartered institutions,
is also available to state chartered associations, provided they meet the requirements of 12
U.S.C. § 1726 (1976). The FSLIC insured 2,053 of the 2,723 state associations existing in
1978. FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD, 1978 COMBINED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 4 (1979).
Thus, dual regulation of state chartered associations is quite common. See Wille, State Bank-
ing: A Study In Dual Regulation, 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 733, 735 (1966).
13 The FHLBB uses essentially the same procedures in processing charter applications
and branch applications. See 12 C.F.R. § 545.14(e) (1979) (referring to 12 C.F.R. §
543.2(c)-(f) (1979)). Recent FHLBB regulations explicitly set out the criteria and proce-
dures to be used in branching cases instead of relying on this cross-reference to chartering
regulations. 44 Fed. Reg. 36,061 (1979).
The Board's primary actors in this process are the Principal Supervisory Agent of the
Board (who may be either the President of the Federal Home Loan Bank of the district in
which the applicant's home office is located or someone designated by the Board) and the
Supervisory Agent (who may be a staff officer or employee of the Board or the Principal
Supervisory Agent). 12 C.F.R. § 545.14(a)(3) (1979). The Supervisory Agent oversees most
of the application process. He is responsible for determining whether a protest to a pro-
posed branch application is "substantial." See 12 C.F.R. § 543.2(3), 545.14(e) (1979). These
regulations do not define "substantial"; it is apparently left to the discretion of the Super-
visory Agent. If a protest is certified as substantial, the protesting party may then request
that oral argument be heard on the application. The regulations provide no procedures for
oral argument, nor do they incorporate any provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-706 (1976). The regulations only mention that exhibits may be re-
ceived and that a transcript will be kept.
14 12 C.F.R. § 545.14(K) (1979).
15 The APA seems like a promising place to look for such a provision. Courts, however,
complemented their early hesitancy to apply the APA's judicial review standards to the
FHLBB (see notes 45-49 and accompanying text infra) by refusing to bind the Board to any
of the APA's procedural safeguards. These procedures are set out in 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559
(1976) and include detailed requirements for certain types of administrative decisionmak-
ing processes. The Home Owners' Loan Act failed to mention the APA or to include any
other procedural requirements, and courts interpreted this omission to mean that the
Board did not have to hold a hearing on a branching decision or to issue findings and
conclusions. See Reich v. Webb, 336 F.2d 153, 159 (9th Cir. 1964) (challenge to transfer of
controlling interest in savings and loan); Bridgeport Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB,
307 F.2d 580, 581 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 950 (1963); FHLBB v. Rowe, 284
F.2d 274, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (charter application); First Nat'l Bank v. First Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 225 F.2d 33, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1955); cf. Home Loan Bank Bd. v. Mallonee, 196
F.2d 336, 379-81 (9th Cir. 1952) (hearing required in some cases involving appointment of
conservator), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 952 (1953).
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in 1966 to provide that the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA)
procedural requirements would apply to certain administrative ac-
tions of the Board,1 6 these amendments did not apply to that sec-
tion of the HOLA which courts have held to be the source of the
FHLBB's branching authority."i Thus, courts have consistently
concluded that the APA neither requires the Board to hold any
kind of a hearing when it acts on a branching application nor to
state reasons for its conclusions.18
These decisions are correct; the APA requirement for a hearing in adjudicatory deci-
sions applies only to those agency decisions "required by statute to be determined on the
record after opportunity for an agency." 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1976) (emphasis
added). The Home Owners' Loan Act has no such statutory requirement. The inapplicability
of the APA hearing procedures to the FHLBB also draws indirect support from the legisla-
tive history of the APA; Congress apparently intended to exclude "banking agencies" from
the various hearing requirements. See COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, AD-
MINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.
142-43 (1943); Administrative Procedure, Part 4: Hearings on S. 674, S. 675, and S. 918 Before
a Subcomm. of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. 1525, 1546 (1941) (state-
ment by Treasury Dept. that administrative procedure bills should not apply to banking
agencies). See generally 1 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 4.04 (1958).
16 Pub. L. No. 89-695, tit. I, § 101(a), 80 Stat. 1028, 1033 (1966).
17 The amendments affected 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(7)(A) (1976), which grants to the
Board wide discretion in regulating "unsafe and unsound" practices of savings and loans
and provides the Board with authority to issue cease and desist orders, remove officers and
directors, and appoint conservators. This language brings any hearings by the Board and
judicial review of Board decisions exclusively under this subsection within the explicit scope
of the APA. But courts have held that the Board's authority to allow branching arises
under either 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1976) or 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c) (1976). See note 10 supra.
18 See note 15 supra. Courts have also reached this result by analogizing to Camp v.
Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973). See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 426 F. Supp. 454,
457 (W.D. Ark. 1977), aff'd sub nom. Fayetteville Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 570 F.2d
693 (8th Cir. 1978); Reliance Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 407 F. Supp. 950, 954 n.1
(N.D. Ill. 1976); Bank of Ozark v. FHLBB, 402 F. Supp. 162, 166 (E.D. Ark. 1975); Elm
Grove Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 391 F. Supp. 1041, 1043 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Lyons Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 377 F. Supp. 11, 24-25 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Benton Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. FHLBB, 365 F. Supp. 1103, 1104 (E.D. Ark. 1973). In Pitts, the Supreme Court
held that the APA did not compel the Comptroller of the Currency, when chartering na-
tional banks, to hold hearings or to make formal findings of fact and law based on a
hearing record. 411 U.S. at 140-41. But the Pitts Court did order the lower court to re-
mand the case for further explanation by the Comptroller. It cited no statutory authority
for this disposition, arguing instead that judicial review was impossible on the existing rec-
ord. See id. at 143. For a discussion of the similar roles of the Comptroller and the
FHLBB, see notes 27-29 and accompanying text infra.
Interestingly, FHLBB regulations prior to 1970 did provide for quasi-trial procedures
even though the courts did not require any hearing. See 12 C.F.R. § 545.14(h)(2) (1970).
See also id. § 545.14(h)(1). In 1970, amendments to these regulations eliminated all refer-
ences to a hearing requirement. See 35 Fed. Reg. 2509, 2511-12 (1970). Since 1970, the
Board has further amended these regulations to require a hearing only in the event of a
"substantial protest." See 12 C.F.R. §§ 543.2(f), 545.14(e) (1979). Thus, the Board has
eliminated the procedural limitations it once imposed upon itself. See generally Scott, In
Quest of Reason: The Licensing Decisions of the Federal Banking Agencies, 42 U. CHI. L. REV.
235, 268-69 (1974).
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B. Judicial Review of Branching Decisions
1. The Applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act
During the 1950's and 1960's, some courts questioned
whether the APA and its standards of judicial review19 applied to
branching decisions of the FHLBB.2 ° Some courts even found
that FHLBB decisions were not susceptible to judicial review of
any kind. 21  This uncertainty had several sources. First, the APA
classifies agency proceedings as either rulemaking or adjudica-
tory.22  Branching decisions do not fit neatly within either cate-
19 The APA sets out six standards for judicial review of administrative decisions:
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and
557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing
provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de
novo by the reviewing court.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1976). Since a court may always review administrative action under (B),
(C), and (D), the question arising in litigation is which, if any, of the other three
standards-arbitrary and capricious, substantial evidence, or trial de novo-is appropriate.
20 See Bridgeport Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 307 F.2d 580, 581-82 (3d Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 950 (1963); First Natl Bank v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
225 F.2d 33, 35-36 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
21 See FHLBB v. Rowe, 284 F.2d 274, 277-79 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (chartering decision);
First Natl Bank v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 225 F.2d 33, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (branch-
ing decision).
22 Rulemaking involves prospective agency policy decisions which apply to a group of
people or entities and is governed by 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976). Adjudication is analogous to a
trial where a decision is rendered based on a record after an agency hearing under 5
U.S.C. § 554 (1976). See Independent Bankers Ass'n of Georgia v. Board of Governors of
Fed. Reserve System, 516 F.2d 1206, 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1975); 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE §§ 7:2-:3 (2d ed. 1979). The substantial evidence standard of review applies
only to those rulemaking and adjudicatory proceedings which require a hearing under 5
U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (1976). See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
414 (1970); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1976). Essentially, courts have applied the substantial
evidence test to review formal rulemaking and adjudicatory decisions made on a record
required by statute. Courts have employed the arbitrary and capricious standard to review
agency decisions involving more informal procedures. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
OF THE SEVENTIES § 29.01-3 (1976). 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (1976) limits the application of the
trial de novo standard to instances where there is inadequate factfinding in an adjudicatory
action, or new issues are raised in a proceeding to enforce nonadjudicatory agency action.
See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415.
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gory because they have features of both.2 3  Second, many courts
interpreted Congress' broad grant of discretionary authority to
the Board as precluding judicial review.24  Third, branching deci-
sions often involve complex policy choices and produce volumi-
nous records of economic evidence. Many courts were content to
leave such decisions to the Board. 25  As a result of this confusion,
courts applied a variety of reviewing standards. 26
Camp v. Pitts,27 a 1973 Supreme Court decision, was the
watershed case concerning the standard for judicial review. In
Pitts, plaintiff challenged a decision of the Comptroller of the
Currency denying its application for a national bank charter. The
Court held that the APA applied and that the proper standard of
review was whether the decision was "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 28
23 See Community Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 443 F. Supp. 927, 932 (E.D. Wis.
1978), vacated on other grounds sub nom. City Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 600 F.2d
681 (7th Cir. 1979).
24 Under 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1976), review of agency action under the APA is pre-
cluded if the "agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." Several courts
interpreted the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 as granting broad discretion to the
FHLBB and, thus, precluded judicial review. See FHLBB v. Rowe, 284 F.2d 274, 277-79
(D.C. Cir. 1960) (chartering decision); First Nat'l Bank v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 225
F.2d 33, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (branching decision).
25 The Federal Home Loan Bank Board is an agency which has been granted a
broad discretion by the Congress in its disposition of applications of the type
involved. The rulings of the Board are the result of its expert judgment, its
policy, the reports, recommendations and analyses of its staff, plus any special
evidence it might conclude necessary to obtain by way of hearing.
Bridgeport Fed. Say. & Loan.Ass'n v. FHLBB, 307 F.2d 580, 584 (3d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 950 (1963).
26 The first reported decision applying the arbitrary and capricious standard to a
branching decision was Central Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 293 F. Supp. 617, 623 (S.D.
Iowa 1968), aff'd, 422 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1970).
27 411 U.S. 138 (1973). Pitts resolved the judicial review issue raised in numerous cases
during the 1960's and early 1970's involving the Comptroller of the Currency, who is
responsible for chartering and regulating national banks. See, e.g., Peoples Bank v. Saxon,
373 F.2d 185 (6th Cir. 1967); Webster Groves Trust Co. v. Saxon, 370 F.2d 381 (8th Cir.
1966); First Nat'I Bank v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1965), aff'd sub nor. First Nat'l
Bank v. Walker Bank, 385 U.S. 252 (1966); Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Camp, 345 F. Supp. 622
(D. Md. 1971).
28 411 U.S. at 142 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976)). See note 19 and accompanying text
supra.
The first holding of Camp v. Pitts was that Comptroller decisions were reviewable. 411
U.S. at 140 (citing Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
156-58 (1970)). This holding contrasts strikingly with the view that prevailed in some fed-
eral courts during the 1950's and 1960's that the Comptroller's decisions were un-
reviewable. See, e.g., Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Gidney, 237 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 847 (1956); Stokes, Public Convenience and Advantage in Applications for Newp Banks
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Because the Comptroller's charter decisions are very similar to
FHLBB branching decisions,2 9 courts reviewing FHLBB cases
have subsequently followed Pitts and applied the arbitrary and ca-
pricious standard.30
Several considerations support the extension of Pitts to
FHLBB branching decisions. Courts have held that the Board's
decisions are sufficiently discretionary to insulate them from judi-
cial review.31 This view, however, is unpersuasive. A statutory
grant of broad discretionary power to an agency does not, without
more, preclude judicial review of agency decisions. 32 Federal
courts have found agency action committed by law to agency dis-
cretion only where: (1) Congress intended to foreclose judicial re-
view; (2) the issue is inappropriate for judicial determination; or
(3) other policy reasons justify denial of review.33 These factors
suggest that the HOLA should not preclude judicial review of
FHLBB branching decisions. 34  Moreover, absent a clear legisla-
and Branches, 74 BANK L.J. 921, 930 (1957) (no right to appeal from Comptroller's deci-
sion). Cf FHLBB v. Rowe, 284 F.2d 274 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (similar attitude for review of
FHLBB decisions); note 21 and accompanying text supra.
29 See Scott, supra note 18, at 243-68 (tracing parallel development of branching author-
ity of Comptroller and FHLBB). This similarity is sufficiently strong that FHLBB cases
often cite 'and apply the holdings from Comptroller cases without discussion of their
applicability. See, e.g., Community Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 443 F. Supp. 927, 933
(E.D. Wis. 1978), vacated and remanded sub nom, City Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 600
F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1979); Bank of Ozark v. FHLBB, 402 F. Supp. 162, 166 (E.D. Ark.
1975); Lyons Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 377 F. Supp. 11, 25 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
30 See Community Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 443 F. Supp. 927, 932-33 (E.D. Wis.
1978), vacated and remanded sub nom, City Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 600 F.2d 681
(7th Cir. 1979); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 426 F. Supp. 454, 458 (W.D. Ark.
1977), aff'd sub nom, Fayetteville Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 570 F.2d 693 (8th Cir.
1978); Bank of Ozark v. FHLBB, 402 F. Supp. 162, 166 (E.D. Ark. 1975); Elm Grove Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 391 F. Supp. 1041, 1042 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Lyons Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. FHLBB, 377 F. Supp. 11, 25 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Benton Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
FHLBB, 365 F. Supp. 1103, 1104 (E.D. Ark. 1973).
" See note 24 supra.
32 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 28.16-1 (1976).
33 Id. at 641. Professor Davis rejects the Supreme Court's formulation, enunciated in
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), that a decision is commit-
ted to agency discretion whenever there is no "law to apply" as being unreliable and con-
trary to previous holdings on this issue. Id.
31 Compare Bridgeport Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 307 F.2d 580 (3d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 950 (1963) and FHLBB v. Rowe, 284 F.2d 274 (D.C. Cir. 1960) and
First Nat'l Bank v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 225 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1955) with K.
DAVIS, supra note 32 (discussing case law on decisions committed to agency discretion).
Although many "standards" have been used to determine what subjects are appropriate for
judicial review, the narrow inquiry is whether the court is "qualified to resolve" the issue.
First Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 445 F. Supp. 1117, 1120 (D. Minn. 1977) (citing K. DAVIS,
ADMINITRATIVE LAW TEXT 515 (3d ed. 1972) (emphasis added)). Branching cases may
involve complex economic data, but courts frequently confront such evidence.
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tive command, courts should be reluctant to refrain from review-
ing administrative action that broadly regulates primary con-
duct.3 5  Finally, the due process clause of the fifth amendment
may require judicial review of all agency action for arbitrariness
and capriciousness, regardless of the APA.36
2. The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard
During the past decade, courts have significantly modified the
arbitrary and capricious standard of review. Courts once viewed
this standard as a general test of rationality, 37 but recently the
Supreme Court has expanded the scope of review available under
the arbitrary and capricious standard.3 8  The Court's 1971 deci-
sion in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe 39 reflects this
trend. The Court remanded this case, challenging a decision of
the Secretary of Transportation, to the lower court. It instructed
the district court to apply the arbitrary and capricious standard by
"consider[ing] whether the decision was based on a consideration
of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error
of judgment." 40
This formulation of the arbitrary and capricious test does not
permit lower federal courts to rubber-stamp administrative deci-
sions; they must subject agency action to searching and substantial
inquiry. 4 The Court promoted active judicial review even
35 FHLBB regulation of the savings and loan industry clearly affects primary conduct
in the business community. See notes 1-3 and accompanying text supra; notes 79-80 and
accompanying text infra.
36 See Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 55
(1965). In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886), the Supreme Court held that
a valid law may not be enforced in an unconstitutional manner. Professor Berger argued
that since an arbitrary and capricious law violates due process, an arbitrary application of
that law, as occurred in Yick Wo, also violates due process. Berger, supra, at 71-74. After
analyzing the legislative history of the APA in light of these constitutional principles, Pro-
fessor Berger concluded that Congress could not have intended to preclude judicial review
of any agency's actions for arbitrariness. Id. at 58-74.
s7 See, e.g., Carlisle Paper Box Co. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 1, 5-6 (3d Cir. 1968); Security
Bank v. Saxon, 298 F. Supp. 991, 992 (E.D. Mich. 1968); East Cent. Motor Carriers Ass'n
v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 591, 594-95 (D.D.C. 1965); Arrowhead Freight Lines v.
United States, 114 F. Supp. 804, 812 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
38 The best indicia of this expansion is the blurring of the distinctions between the
arbitrary and capricious test and the substantial evidence standard. See K. DAVIS, supra note
32 at § 29.00. See generally note 19 supra. Courts once allowed "considerably more generous
judicial review" under the latter. Abbott Laboratories v. Garner, 387 U.S. 136, 143 (1967).
39 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
40 Id. at 416.
41 [T]he arbitrary and capricious standard of review ... is not a ritualistic proce-
dure by which courts summarily endorse agency decisions as correct. To the
[Vol. 65:449
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further in Camp v. Pitts by ordering the district court to remand to
the Comptroller a case contesting his denial of a bank charter ap-
plication. The record failed to reveal the grounds for the adminis-
trative decision and thus did not afford an adequate basis for ju-
dicial review. 42  Both the Supreme Court 43 and lower federal
contrary, a reviewing court must engage in a "substantial inquiry" into the
facts, an inquiry that is "searching and careful," in order to determine whether
the agency decision was based on a consideration of relevant factors ... [citing
Overton Park inter alia]. In complicated cases such as this one, moreover, the
court must undertake an intensive review of the evidence relied upon by the
agency in reaching its decision.
NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 280, 304-05 (D. Del. 1978).
Accord, National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938, 956-62 (D.C. Cir.
1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 436 U.S. 775 (1978); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,
541 F.2d 1, 34-35 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); Chrysler Corp. v. DOT, 472
F.2d 659, 664-71 (6th Cir. 1972).
The need for this substantial inquiry intensifies when evidence before the court
suggests an agency has made inconsistent decisions: "While the courts cannot be concerned
with the consistency or inconsistency of the conclusions and findings of the Commission,
consistency of administrative rulings is essential, for to adopt different standards for similar
situations is to act arbitrarily." HC&D Moving & Storage Co. v. United States, 298 F. Supp.
746, 751 (D.C. Hawaii 1969) (quoting Dixie Highway Express, Inc. v. United States, 268 F.
Supp. 239, 241 (S.D. Miss. 1967) (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). Accord, Marco
Sales Co. v. FTC, 453 F.2d 1, 7 (2d Cir. 1971); National Alliance of Postal & Fed.
Employees v. Nickerson, 424 F. Supp. 323, 327 (D.D.C. 1976). See generally 2 K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TRFATISE § 8:9, at 196-200 (2d ed. 1979).
4? 411 U.S. at 142-43.
'3 See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, 435 U.S. 519, 542-50 (1978); FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423 U.S.
326, 331 (1976); Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 571 (1975); Bowman Transp., Inc. v.
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974); Gulf States Utils. Co. v. FPC,
411 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1973); cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943) (holding that
court should remand decision to agency for better explanation).
In Bachowski, the Court held that, under the arbitrary and capricious standard of re-
view, the Secretary of Labor had to give a statement of reasons for his decision for the
lower court to intelligently review the case because the decision involved the Secretary's
expertise and policy. 421 U.S. at 571. See generally K. DAVIS, supra note 32, § 29.01-6, at
271-72 (Supp. 1978). The Vermont Yankee decision reaffirmed the holding and disposition
of Camp v. Pitts in a case reviewing informal administrative rulemaking. 435 U.S. at 548-49.
The Court harshly criticized the D.C. Circuit for imposing its own idea of rulemaking
procedures on the agency when it had no authority to do so. The Court, however, still
remanded the decision for the D.C. Circuit to consider whether the agency's rule was sus-
tainable on the administrative record. Id. at 549.
These cases may even have reversed the relative strictness of the two standards of
review. In Bowman, Justice Douglas implied that review under the arbitrary and capricious
standard may be broader than under the substantial evidence test in some cases because a
decision supported by substantial evidence "may nonetheless reflect arbitrary and capri-
cious action." 419 U.S. at 284.
Professor Davis has argued that the use of the phrase "clear error of judgment" in
Overton Park tended to equate the arbitrary and capricious standard with the "dearly er-
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courts 44 have subsequently relied on this rationale.
3. Application of the Arbitrary and Capricious Standard to FHLBB
Branching Decisions
The modern interpretation of the arbitrary and capricious
standard has not exerted a discernible effect on judicial review of
FHLBB branching decisions. Although courts have purported to
follow Pitts,45 they have done so in form rather than substance.
Instead of engaging in a searching review of the record and re-
manding cases which lack adequate explanations, several courts
have upheld Board decisions supported only by a cursory statement
by the Board that the applicant has or has not satisfied the
branching criteria. 46  Elm Grove Savings & Loan Association v.
roneous" standard, which is the narrowest form of judicial scrutiny of facts. K. DAVis, supra
note 32, § 29.00, at 648. He reasoned that the Court clearly committed an inadvertent
error, and as a result lower courts might interpret Overton Park as mandating much nar-
rower review under the arbitrary and capricious standard. Id. He criticized the Camp v.
Pitts decision for failing to clarify Overton Park's language, although he conceded that Pitts
clearly distinguished the substantial evidence standard from the arbitrary and capricious
standard. Id. at 651. Davis's criticism of Overton Park and Camp v. Pitts is diluted by his own
conclusion that the label courts give a reviewing standard is trivial compared to what they
actually do:
[w~hat matters is that federal judges generally understand that they may not
properly substitute their judgment for administrative judgment except on ques-
tions of law ... and that in most cases other factors have a much stronger
influence than the words of the formula that is supposed to apply. Whatever
the formulas, good judges customarily tread lightly when they are impressed
with the care, conscientiousness, and balance of the administrators ....
Id. at 653.
44 See, e.g., American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 447 (7th Cir. 1975); National
Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 701-04 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 827 (1975); Coates v. Laird, 494 F.2d 709, 711 (4th Cir. 1974); Calcutta E. Coast of
India & E. Pakistan/U.S.A. Conf. v. FMC, 399 F.2d 994, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1968); McNutt v.
Hills, 426 F. Supp. 990, 1004 (D.D.C. 1977). Cf. Hill v. Morton, 525 F.2d 327, 328 (10th
Cir. 1975) (district court opinion which failed to explain why agency decision was arbitrary
and capricious did not provide basis for judicial review); First Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 508
F.2d 1371, 1374 (8th Cir. 1974) (appellate court reviews evidence anew under arbitrary
and capricious standard), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 930 (1975).
45 See cases cited in note 30 supra.
46 For example, in Reliance Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 407 F. Supp. 950 (N.D.
Ill. 1976), the court cited the following conclusory statement by the Board as satisfying the
requirements of the branching regulations under the arbitrary and capricious standard:
"[A] necessity exists for such a branch office, ... there is a reasonable probability of its
usefulness and success, and ... it can be established without undue injury to properly
conducted existing local thrift and home-financing institutions." Id. at 954.
These decisions rely on a statement by the Court in Pitts that although "[t]he explana-
tion may have been curt ... it surely indicated the determinative reason for the final action
taken." 411 U.S. at 143. This reliance is misplaced, for the Court did not intend to sanction
"curt" explanations for any administrative decision; the Court was merely distinguishing
Overton Park from the instant case. Unfortunately, several courts have seized upon this
statement to uphold cursory administrative statements of reasons and conclusions.
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FHLBB 47 typifies this approach:
[T]he question on review is whether there is at least some evi-
dence in the record to support the agency's decision. So long as
there exists some rational basis for the agency's action, it may not
be upset on review. 48
This application of the standard neutralizes the impact of Camp v.
Pitts on judicial review in FHLBB cases.4 9
II
CITY FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION V. FHLBB
In City Federal Savings & Loan Association v. FHLBB 50 the
Seventh Circuit vacated two district court decisions upholding the
FHLBB's approval of branch applications for a Milwaukee savings
and loan association. In the first case, 51 the lower court upheld
Other courts, however, have closely reviewed the facts underlying Board decisions. See
Benton County Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 450 F. Supp. 884, 887-88 (W.D. Ark. 1978);
First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 426 F. Supp. 454, 458-61 (W.D. Ark. 1977), aff'd
sub nom, Fayetteville Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 570 F.2d 693 (8th Cir. 1978); Bank of
Ozark v. FHLBB, 402 F. Supp. 162, 168-70 (E.D. Ark. 1975). This approach is more
consistent with the general interpretation of the arbitrary and capricious standard.
41 391 F. Supp. 1041 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
48 Id. at 1042 (quoting Winnetka Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, No. 73-C-2820, slip op.
at 6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 20, 1975)). The court went on to uphold the Board's decision. Id. at
1043-44.
" Courts have also found that brief, conclusory statements can satisfy the arbitrary and-
capricious text in Comptroller cases, which eviscerates Camp v. Pitts. See Scott, supra note
18, at 264-68. First Natl Bank v. Smith, 508 F.2d 1371 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 930 (1975), exemplifies these cases. After citing Pitts for the appropriate reviewing
standard, the court interpreted this test as requiring the decision only to have a rational
basis and that "the party challenging the action must prove that it was 'willful and un-
reasoning action, without consideration and in disregard of the facts or circumstances of
the case.'" 508 F.2d at 1376 (quoting 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure §
209, at 569 (1951)). One court held that state banking law, not Camp v. Pitts, determined
the appropriate standard of review for the Comptroller's chartering decisions. Grenada
Bank v. Watson, 361 F. Supp. 728, 732 (N.D. Miss. 1973). Several Comptroller cases, mis-
takenly relying on language in Camp v. Pitts (see note 48 supra), have also upheld "curt"
explanations by the Comptroller. See Central Bank v. Smith, 532 F.2d 37, 39-40 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 895 (1976); City Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 513 F.2d 479, 484-85 (D.C. Cir.
1975); Bank of Commerce v. City Natl Bank, 484 F.2d 284, 288-89 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1974).
51 600 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1979).
31 Community Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 443 F. Supp. 927 (E.D. Wis. 1978), vacated
and remanded sub nom, City Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 600 F.2d 681 (7th Cir.
1979).
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the Board's decision granting an application which the Board had
denied to the same association under similar circumstances four
years earlier.52  In the second case,53 the district court affirmed
the Board's approval of a limited facility branch application for
the same association involved in the first case.54
The Seventh Circuit remanded both cases to the FHLBB,
holding that "the reasons for the Board['s] decisions [were] not
explained adequately to permit judicial review at this time in
either case." 55  The court did not want to make judicial review a
"token matter." 56  On the other hand, it had to avoid substituting
its judgment for that of the Board. It justified its holding by as-
serting that a court "cannot properly restrain its review unless the
agency gives an adequate explanation of the connection between
the record before it and the choice it makes." 5 7
This ruling harmonizes the Seventh Circuit's treatment of
FHLBB decisions with judicial review of other administrative deci-
sions under the arbitrary and capricious standard.5 8  Review is
limited only by the admonition that a court may not merely substi-
tute its own judgment for that of the Board. A court should hesi-
tate to overturn a FHLBB decision if it determines, after scrutiny
of the record, that the Board carefully considered the facts, but if
the record does not reflect reasoned consideration, or if the
Board failed to explain its decision adequately in the face of both
favorable and unfavorable evidence, the court should reverse or
remand the FHLBB's decision. 59
Although the court framed City Federal in terms of the gen-
eral application of the arbitrary and capricious standard, the deci-
sion is likely to have a unique impact on the FHLBB. The
Seventh Circuit's holding requires the Board to make findings
52 Id. at 929-31.
11 City Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 441 F. Supp. 89 (E.D. Wis. 1977), vacated
and remanded, 600 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1979).
"' Id. at 98. A limited branch facility is defined in 12 C.F.R. § 545.14(j) (1979). The
Board may approve the establishment of such a facility if it finds that the "necessity and
reasonable probability of usefulness and success" of the branch does note satisfy the criteria
for a regular branch office but "are met to a degree which would support a limited opera-
tion of a branch office." Id. The district court in City Federal held that judicial review of a
limited facility branch "is even more circumscribed than review of [a] decision on a branch
application." 441 F. Supp. at 97.
55 600 F.2d at 688.
56 Id. at 692.
57 Id. at 688.
"8 See notes 45-49 and accompanying text supra.
59 600 F.2d at 688-89.
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and conclusions of some kind when evaluating branch applica-
tions. The court stressed that unless the Board indicates at least
the "grounds and essential facts" supporting its decisions,60 judi-
cial review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is impossi-
ble. Unfortunately, neither the HOLA nor the APA require the
Board to conduct hearings, make formal findings and conclusions,
or state the reasons for its decisions. 6 1 Under what authority,
then, may a court remand a branching decision to the FHLBB to
state reasons and conclusions that it never had an obligation to
reveal?
Arguably, section 706 of the APA 61 supports the City Federal
decision by implication. Section 706 requires judicial review based
on the "whole record" as developed by the agency. 63 There can
be no review when there is no record before the court, as the
Supreme Court reasoned in Overton Park.64 No court, however,
has adequately explored this statutory basis for the "remand if
lacking explanation" disposition of a case.65
Policy considerations shore up this statutory analysis, how-
ever.6 6  Without an explanation of an agency's action, the review-
60 Id. at 689 (quoting Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 573-74 (1975)). The court
indicated that review should be possible if the Board states its "grounds and essential
facts." Id.
61 Id. at 689. Accord, Bank of Ozark v. FHLBB, 402 F. Supp. 162, 166 (E.D. Ark.
1975); Elm Grove Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 391 F. Supp. 1041, 1043 (E.D. Wis. 1975);
Lyons Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 377 F. Supp. 11, 25 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Guaranty Sav. &
Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 330 F. Supp. 470, 473 (D.D.C. 1971).
62 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
63 In Overton Park, the Court remanded because the lower court did not review the
decision based on the whole record, as required under § 706, and not because of a lack of
a formal statement of reasons. 401 U.S. at 417-20. The Camp v. Pitts opinion extended this
interpretation by holding that the administrative decision must be "sustainable on the ad-
ministrative record made." 411 U.S. at 143. The logical conclusion, then, is that a record
which lacks an explanation is not sufficient to constitute the "whole record" required for
judicial review under § 706.
64 401 U.S. at 419.
5 The City Federal court noted in a footnote that the APA did not provide the basis for
its decision to remand for a statement of reasons; it implied that the HOLA required the
Board to state reasons. 600 F.2d at 689 n. 11. No other court has cited the HOLA for this
proposition.
It is arguable that § 706 and its "whole record" requirement is only a directive to
reviewing courts, and not a command to administrative agencies to develop hearing rec-
ords. Nevertheless, there is a right to judicial review in these cases (see notes 31-36 and
accompanying text supra), and an agency should not be able to cripple this review by refus-
ing to make an administrative record.
66 As far back as 1943, the Supreme Court stated:
If the action rests upon an administrative determination-an exercise of judg-
ment in an area which Congress has entrusted to the agency-of course it must
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ing court must either replace the agency's judgment with its own
or abdicate the reviewing function by accepting the ,agency's
judgment without inquiry.67  The City Federal court avoided this
choice by remanding for clarification:
In some circumstances, however, the record before an agency
shows that significant questions were seriously contested. If the
agency decision does not address these issues, even a restrained
exercise of judicial review is impossible, and a remand for
clarification is necessary.68
This result preserves the courts' role without extending it beyond
its rational boundaries.
In addition, City Federal fosters the integrity of the adminis-
trative process. In the absence of a statute that directly requires
the FHLBB to hold a hearing on branch applications, 69 the court's
demand for a statement of reasons is the only safeguard against
arbitrary administrative action. 70  "[A]s a fundamental require-
not be set aside because the reviewing court might have made a different de-
termination were it empowered to do so. But if the action is based upon a
determination of law as to which the reviewing authority of the courts does
come into play, an order may not stand if the agency has misconceived the law.
In either event the orderly functioning of the process of review requires that
the grounds upon which the administrative agency acted be clearly disclosed
and adequately sustained.
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943).
67 City Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 600 F.2d 681, 688 (7th Cir. 1979). It is
important to distinguish judicial review of administrative action from other forms of re-
view, including constitutional review under the rational basis test. Although arbitrary and
capricious agency action may also be unconstitutional, these two standards serve different
functions. Rational basis review is designed to determine whether there is a legitimate,
rational connection between a problem and its legislative solution. Arbitrary action may
result from improper motivation, impermissible legal grounds, unsupported evidence, or
other improprieties that a rationale basis test would not necessarily reveal. See Berger, supra
note 36 at 82-83. The arbitrary and capricious test is designed to discover and overturn
such decisions.
68 Id. at 689. See note 41 supra.
69 See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
70 Judge Stephens expressed this point well in 1938: "The requirement of findings is
thus far from a technicality. On the contrary, it is to insure against Star Chamber methods,
to make certain that justice shall be administered according to facts and law." Saginaw
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 96 F.2d 554, 559 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom, Gross v.
Saginaw Broadcasting Co., 305 U.S. 613 (1938). See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 550,
572 (1975) ("'reasons' requirement promotes thought by the Secretary and compels him to
cover the relevant points and eschew irrelevancies"); Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Ad-
ministrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 258, 302-03 (1978) ("The language [quoted above
from Bachowski] is broad enough to reflect a new approach to policymaking and some have
so viewed it." (footnote omitted)). Although this may not be a panacea, such a judicial
reviewing policy, if nothing more, announces to administrators that the court will no
longer defer blindly to their discretion.
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ment of fair play, parties should know why a particular decision
was [made]." 71 Awareness of the grounds for agency decisions
will also enhance faith in the administrative process-a process
responsible for a steadily increasing proportion of lawmaking to-
day. 72  Stating the reasons for its decisions should not burden the
Board unduly.73  The Ciy Federal court recognized that a state-
ment of reasons need not be written with artistic refinement and
that a separate statement may not be essential in every case.7 4
Judicial legislation of this sort arguably violates separation of powers. The courts, how-
ever, have a primary duty here: guarding against arbitrary administrative action. For
courts to carry out their duty, they may need to adopt rules and procedures which indi-
rectly affect matters of legislative policy.
71 Flick, Administrative Adjudications and the Duty to Give Reasons-A Search for Criteria,
1978 PUBLIC L. 18, 19. Preservation of fundamental values of fair play in administrative
procedure is a problem that both courts and commentators have wrestled with since Roscoe
Pound's controversial speech to the ABA in 1906 when he questioned the wisdom of im-
posing adversarial concepts on administrative procedure. See Pound, The Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395, 397 (1906), reprinted in 57
A.B.A.J. 348, 349 (1971). Although most judges, lawyers, and legislatures believed the ad-
versarial approach was best for administrative procedure, Congress in the APA adopted a
different approach, recognizing that general procedural guidelines would be sufficient to
assure administrative fairness. Verkuil, supra note 70, at 276-79. Justice Frankfurter was
one of the first to recognize that the adversarial model was not appropriate for administra-
tive procedure: "These differences in origin and function [between the courts and adminis-
trative agencies] preclude wholesale transplantation of the rules of procedure, trial, and
review which have evolved from the history and experience of courts." FCC v. Pottsville
Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143 (1940). The problem now is to determine what proce-
dures are necessary to maintain democratic ideals of fair play while permitting implemen-
tations of administrative goals. Verkuil, supra note 70, at 282. Justice Frankfurter also
answered this question: "To be sure, the laws under which these agencies operate prescribe
the fundamentals of fair play. They require that interested parties be afforded an oppor-
tunity for hearing and that judgment must express a reasoned conclusion." Pottsville Broad-
casting, 309 U.S. at 143-44.
72 Professor Davis notes that there is a tendency for administrative agencies in the
1970's to rely on informal rulemaking procedures which, unlike their formal counterparts,
do not require an agency to provide a hearing. Moreover, informal rulemaking is generally
reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard, whereas formal rulemaking is sub-
ject to the substantial evidence test. See K. DAVIS, supra note 32, §§ 29.01, 29.01-2 (Supp.
1978).
73 The Administrative Conference of the United States has recommended that if the
FHLBB's decision is contested, if an invested person makes a request for a statement of
reasons, or if the case presents issues of general importance, the Broad should furnish a
written opinion. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1974-75 REPORT
38-40 (1976) (Recommendation 75-1). The Conference also recommended that a written
opinion be furnished as a matter of course in all chartering decisions by the FHLBB. Id.
The Conference reasoned that this scheme was an adequate compromise between eliminat-
ing review and requiring a written statement in each case. Id.
74 600 F.2d at 693 (citing SEC v. Chenery, 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943)). Critics might cite
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), to cast doubt on the thesis of this Note.
CORNELL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 65:449
Finally, requiring the Board to explain its decisions in branch-
ing cases will force the FHLBB to articulate its branching policy
clearly. An intelligibJe policy will better guide the primary conduct
of those affected by these decisions -savings and loan associations
planning to file or challenge a branching application. A clearly
stated FHLBB policy also would be susceptible to congressional
evaluation and modification. Congress has allowed the Board to
develop its policies freely, presumably "giving primary considera-
tion to the best practices" for savings and loans. 75  But this quies-
cence may be inappropriate; savings and loan branching policy
exerts a significant impact on the public interest which the Board
may overlook. The Board has concluded that "increased oppor-
tunity for branching will improve competition and enhance con-
sumer services without harming small competitive institutions."76
But branching affects location, hours of operation, and other fac-
tors that determine competition for savings and loan services.7 7
Although large single-unit savings and loans may compete effec-
tively against associations with branches, unrestricted branching
throughout the industry may result in concentration and the
elimination of smaller, marginal associations.7 8  Several commen-
tators believe that the gains in efficiency achieved through con-
centration outweigh the costs of concentration,7 9 but none can
There, the Court soundly reprimanded the D.C. Circuit Court for "unwarranted judicial
examination of perceived procedural shortcomings of a rulemaking proceeding [which
would] seriously interfere with that process prescribed by Congress." Id. at 548. Vermont
Yankee is distinguishable, however, from cases such as City Federal and Camp v. Pitts which
remanded administrative decisions for failure to state reasons. In Vermont Yankee, the D.C.
Circuit held that a rule promulgated by the Atomic Energy Commission was invalid be-
cause of perceived inadequacies in the rulemaking proceedings. Id. at 541. Although the
lower court had not specifically set out procedures for the Commission to use, the Su-
preme Court criticized the lower court's interference with the agency's authority to fashion
its own rules. Id. at 542-45. The City Federal decision does not attempt to invalidate any
valid FHLBB rule or to invalidate the procedures the Board follows. Instead, it only re-
quires that the Board state reasons for its decisions as a prequisite to the court's effective
exercise of the judicial reviewing function.
75 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1976).
76 44 Fed. Reg. 36,059 (1979).
7 See Note, Branch Banking in Utah: Legal and Economic Analysis, 9 UTAH L. REv. 372,
374-76, 391-92 (1964).
78 See Gilbert & Longbrake, The Effects of Branching by Financial Institutions on Competi-
tion, Productive Efficiency and Stability: An Examination of the Evidence, 4 J. BANK RESEARCH
154, 298- 04 (1974) (same conclusion applied to commercial banks); Verkuil, Perspectives on
Reform of Financial Institutions, 83 YALE L.J. 1349, 1361-66 (1974).
71 See, e.g., Brigham & Pettit, supra note 1, at 1025-28; Clark, supra note 5, at 39-40 &
n.116.
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strike the balance precisely.80 Congressional intent on this issue is
unclear; the original rationale underlying Congress' creation of
federally chartered savings and loans and the FHLBB has limited
relevance today.8' The Board may also be incapable of develop-
ing a reasoned, unbiased branching policy without congressional
guidance.8 "
CONCLUSION
In the past, courts have failed to review FHLBB decisions
meaningfully. City Federal Savings & Loan Association v. FHLBB
subjected an FHLBB decision to a rigorous inquiry by adopting a
modern interpretation of the arbitrary and capricious standard of
judicial review. The Board has generally failed to issue explana-
tions adequate to support judicial review under the arbitrary and
capricious standard, and to guide the primary conduct of savings
and loans. City Federal may curtail this ill-advised practice, at least
where it seriously hinders judicial review of administrative action.
Jeffrey Heller
so No one can determine whether the danger of oligopolistic behavior which accom-
panies increasing concentration outweighs the benefits of efficiency due to economies of
scale. The structure of the savings and loan industry hampers any inquiry into the field.
Studies of the effects of concentration in the banking industry tend to focus on quantifi-
able factors such as interest rates, cost of checking account services, and the price of other
banking services. See Clark, supra note 5, at 39-40 & n.l 16. But the government limits
competition involving many of these price related factors. See, e.g., Regulation Q, 12 C.F.R.
pt. 217 (1979) (limiting rate of return on accounts in national banks); 12 C.F.R. pt. 526
(1979) (limiting rate of return on accounts in savings and loans). These regulations limit
the dangers flowing from concentration to the extent that they hold the cost of savings and
loan services close to a competitive level. On the other hand, such non-price factors as
hours of operation, branches, and customer service are a significant source of competition.
See generally Note, supra note 77, at 375. Thus, even though price competition is limited in
the savings and loan industry, avoiding concentration is important to consumer interests.
Branching policy should be geared toward maintaining the level of competition among
associations.
81 Congress passed this legislation during the Depression to prevent the failure of the
savings and loan industry. See Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fox, 459 F. Supp. 903,
908-10 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
82 Congress has delegated to the Board a wide range of powers. Since the Board is an
independent agency, there is little legislative or executive control over its functions. Like
most administrative agencies, the Board is highly susceptible to pressures of the industry it
regulates. T. MARVELL, THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD 217-18 (1969). As a result,
"the FHLBB is subject to lopsided pressures-a great deal from the industry and none
from the account holders and borrowers. In similar situations, some federal agencies have
employees whose function is to air peoples' interests that would not otherwise come to
light. The FHLBB could do the same." Id. at 231.
